

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BIOGRAPHIC REPORT

NAME **HEUSCHKE, Aris al (Naz)**

CASE NO.
DATE **18 Nov. 1971**

NATIONALITY	Palestinian	BIRTHDATE	c. 1893
PRESENT POSITION	Political Exile (Former Haffi of Jerusalem)	BIRTHPLACE	Jerusalem
LOCATION	Villa Aida, Heliopolis (Cairo-Egypt)	RACE	White
GEN. OCCUPATION	Political leader	SEX	Male
EDUCATION	St. George's School in Jerusalem; Al-Azhar Univer- sity in Cairo.	MARITAL STATUS	Married
LANGUAGES	Arabic, French, English, German, Turkish	NAME OF SPOUSE	Unknown
HONORS		CHILDREN	6 children (1-25 year old boy) (5 girls-8-25 years of age)
		RELIGION	Sunni- Moslem
		POLITICAL AFFILIATION	Close relations with Arab League.
		ATTITUDE TOWARDS:	U.S. Formerly neu- tral (now questionable) U.S.S.R. Questionable

REMARKS:

1914-1918 Made Pilgrimage to Mecca; Enlisted in Turkish Army.1/
1918-1919 Appointed to British Public Security Service in Palestine.1/
Later transferred to French Secret Service, Damascus.1/
1920 Implicated in anti-Jewish riots; fled to Transjordan;
Sentenced to ten years in chains by British.1/
1921 Pardonned by Sir Herbert Samuel, British High Commissioner in
Palestine; Selected as Haffi of Jerusalem by Arabs and
British.1/
1922 Elected, president of the Supreme Muslim Conference.1/
1923-1933 Active in Arab Independence Movement opposing British Mandate.2/
1930 Appointed Member of Arab Delegation to the London Shaw Inquiry
Commission.1/
1936 Elected President, Arab Higher Committee, 25 April.1/
1936-1937 Arab Higher Committee and Supreme Council dissolved following
Arab riots and assassination of British Commissioner;
Haffi took refuge in Jerusalem Mosque.1/2/
1937 Escaped to Jaffa, then to Lebanon, October.1/
Offered asylum in Italian Libya.1/
1939 Joined Rashid Ali Gaidani in England.1/
1941 Participated in Rashid Ali's revolt; Proclaimed himself Prime
Minister of Iraq Signed secret Treaty with Germany and Italy,
10 April.1/
- - - Fled to Japanese Legation in Tehran, May.1/
- - - Magnified as Italian, fled to Rome, September.1/
- - - Joined Ali Gaidani in Berlin; began broadcasts to Arabs for
Axis, 5 November.1/
1943. Haffi ended pro-Axis Propaganda 15 June.1/

RECENT, Arab al (Maj)

Country (Continued)

1945 Fled to Austria; then to Switzerland; Reported to France, where
he was placed under house arrest. 1/2/45
1946 Nafdi escaped from house arrest; Received by King Farouk,
29 May. 1/46
1948 Established seat of Palestine Arab Government in Gaza, September. 1/46
1948-1949 Nafdi fails to unite Arabs on Palestine Question. 1/46
1949 Journeys to Saudi Arabia to obtain Ibn Saud's support, October. 1/46
Visited Damascus to prevent Iraqi-Syrian union. 1/46
1951 Presides over the World Muslim Conference in Karachi,
February. 1/2/51/2/51
Visits Beirut to contact leaders of Fatah-I-Islam (Grandsons
of Iqbal). 3/51
Reported with Palestinian agents preventing defection of seven
million Syrian tribesmen from Pakistan to Afghanistan,
March. 1/3/51
Accompanied Ghulam Abbas, Supreme head of the Kashmir Liberation
movement, to the cease-fire line in NW sector, 25 March. 5/51
Arrived in Beirut as guest of President of Syrian Chamber,
Marwan Bishara, to rally support against Israel, May. 1/51
Nafdi praised by Prince Faisal, June. 8/51
Nafdi confers with Colonel Shihab, Syrian Chief of Staff, in
Beirut on recruitment of Palestinian veterans into Syrian and
Egyptian armies, 4 June. 8/51
Discontinued by Syrian Foreign Office for interference in state
affairs, 15 June. 10/51
Calls for direct negotiation of Palestine refugees for American
aid, Nafdi forced to quit Syria;
Nafdi and revolutionary leader, Fawzi al-Qawakibi, reported in
Beirut village of Qarnah, 16 July. 12/51
Member of Nafdi's "Jihad Movement" party assassinated King
Abdullah, 20 July. 12/51
Calls press conference in Cairo and denies complicity in plot
against King Abdullah; Condemns British for seizure of
Palestine for Jordan, 6 August. 16/51
Plot to assassinate Maj Amin reported, 17 August. 18/51
Nafdi sends six Palestinian war veterans to Damascus to train
under Colonel Shihab, 24 August. 19/51
Nafdi reported ready to ally himself with Russia or US,
25 August. 20/51
Nafdi confers with Egyptian and Saudi Arabian Foreign
Ministers at Saudi Embassy in Cairo; gains prestige, 25
August. 21/51
Suggests that Muslim Conference to be held in Beirut to
unite Arab al-Qawakibi, 25 September. 22/51
Nafdi said to offer terrorists to Muslim Brotherhood for sabotage
against Trans Arabian Pipeline, 25 October. 24/51
Organizes sabotage against British, Americans, and French to show
support of Egypt's abrogation move, 3 November. 25/51

MEMORANDUM, Amin al (Maj.)

Summary: (Continued)

Lebanon was also included in the Mufti's travels about this same time. Further by coincidence or not, the pro-British Premier, Hied el Solh of Lebanon, was assassinated by a Syrian nationalist on 17 July at the end of his four day visit with King Abdullah. In Jordan, Hied el Solh was reported to have discussed means by which the Arab World could work out a modus vivendi with Israel.^{13/}

The Mufti's comingling in Damascus was suddenly halted when his opponents learned that he was encouraging the Palestinian refugees to negotiate directly with the United States for aid, rather than allowing the Arab states to mediate for them. With the charge that the Mufti was undermining the Arab Cause, his opponents were able to force his departure from Damascus. Nail Ghuri, the ex-Mufti's agent was appointed to handle future contacts with the Syrian Army.^{14/}

Urgent attempts were made by the State Department to locate the ex-Mufti after his departure, but it was not until the 16th of July that he was discovered in the Druse Settlement of Qarnail in central Lebanon ^{15/} in the company of Fawzi Ennahjil, the chief Arab Guerrilla leader during the Palestinian War.^{16/}

The Mufti's complicity in the assassination of King Abdullah 20th July was immediately inferred from the identity of the assassin, Shamir Laban, a member of the Jihad Movement, an extremist Arab organization created by the Mufti in 1948.^{17/} A reign of terror followed as refugee camps were raided for possible persons involved in the plot.^{18/} The ex-Mufti then appealed to Ibn Saud for both financial aid and political mediation with the Jordan Government to stop the "atrocities."^{19/} While funds were given to the ex-Mufti, the Saudi Arabian monarch refused to become involved in the dispute regarding the suspects and disorders.^{20/} As the ex-Mufti was employing every means possible to deliver four of the six sentenced men (two were sentenced to death immediately),^{21/} it was reported that the Regent, Naif, Milhad Pasha and the Jordanian Prime Minister were equipping assassins to even the score with the Mufti.^{22/}

The Jordan Government's claims were formally answered by the ex-Mufti at a press conference held on 5 August in Cairo. There he denied complicity in the plot against King Abdullah and stated "political assassinations are not in the interest of the Arab countries and could only have dire results."^{23/} At this press conference he also denied having a mythical named Musa Sa'ad al Masoudi described in the Egyptian Gazette of 7 August as the principle person involved in the Plot.^{24/} (Other reports refer to Musa Sa'ad as the ex-Mufti's cousin)^{25/26/27/} He also attacked the Jordan government for their note to Egypt claiming that his activities be stopped, and charged that foreign eye-witnesses could verify his claims that the major atrocities were committed by the Jordan Police and the Arab Legion.^{28/}

Early in September the Mufti renewed his efforts to bring about Muslim unity against the British by suggesting to Mallah Abd al Qadir Khashmi of Iran, that a Muslim conference similar to the one held in Pakistan be held in Tehran.^{29/} (Mallah Khashmi is the chief of the functional terrorist organization, Polaym-i-Iran whose members are held responsible for six murders since approximately July 1990.^{30/} Mallah Khashmi has guaranteed the Mufti full protection and all the necessary travel visas for his entourage.^{31/}

1977 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

Basoud, Amir al (Am)

Basoud (Continued)

According to the Beirut source, who received information third-hand from a Lebanese Communist, the Hefi is supposedly receiving money from the Communist. He suggests the possibility that the Soviet Union may have decided to use a Palestinian movement to gain control of Iran rather than employ the obviously Communist Tudeh Party.^{28/} It should be noted however, in considering the working possibilities of the above leaders that the ex-Hefi is a Sunniite Y while fellow Basoud is a prominent Shiite leader.^{29/}

A usually reliable source states that the former Grand Hefi has established the focus of the Muslim Brotherhood with his own territories in order to submerge for such subgroups may be questioned since there appears to be no proof that the Israelis are receiving aid from Egypt, and furthermore the Trans-Arabian Oil Co. has recently presented \$65,000 for the relief of the Arab refugees.^{30/}

The strength of Basoud's influence has fluctuated considerably in the last several years. In the winter of 1948 his prestige suffered by his inability to unite the Arab War^{31/} on the Palestine question Y but more recent reports indicate that his power is growing.

Basoud is said to command the loyalty of over 90% of the Palestinian refugees.^{32/} Another source indicates that his influence within the inner circle of the Arab League has waned although his prestige in the Arab World at large is still high.^{33/} The latter opinion is substantiated by Arab League leaders protesting the Hefi from administering funds for the Arab refugees. They fear his possible connections with Moscow and the fact that he might use their funds for his own political purposes.^{34/} Possibly as a consequence, the Hefi encouraged the Palestinian refugees to negotiate directly with the UN for aid as opposed to the Arab League administering such funds.^{35/} Moreover he was accused of undermining the strength of the Arab Cause and forced to leave Syria.^{36/}

The Hefi's policies are clearly directed toward the maintenance of the Palestinian refugees as a political entity and has therefore expressed concern over those still in Lebanon 37/ and UNRWA's efforts to resettle the refugees abroad. He stated recently, however, that he would not oppose their resettlement into Syria where some are already in the Syrian Army.^{38/}

The major part of Basoud's bargaining strength now depends upon his political affiliations with the Arab states. One of his most persistent struggles has been against the Hashimites (rulers of Iraq and Jordan).^{39/} The ex-Hefi's antipathy has been expressed by the Hashimites consistently pro-British policies, which Basoud feels has delayed Arab independence and unity.^{40/}

Basoud realizes that Egypt's primary among the Arab states depends upon the Hashimites weakness.^{41/} His relations with King Farouk are superficially good. According to one source the ex-Hefi is determined by King Farouk, but the latter recognizes the Hefi's political prestige - especially enhanced by the assassination of King Abdallah, and feels he would be a valuable ally for the future.^{42/}

The ex-Hefi has also maintained good relations with anti-Hashimite Iran

DISSENT, Arab al (No.)

Summary (Continued)

and, whose suppression over the Jordan Arab Legion is well known.^{29/} Although King Ibn Saud illustrates the fact he feels that he is the only strong champion of a free Palestine. King Ibn Saud has openly favored the restoration of the independence of Eastern Palestine and the holding of an impartial plebiscite there.^{30/} This may be one of the reasons the fact insists on the entry of the Palestinian refugees.

The fact is not doubt sure that certain factions in Syria would oppose the union of Iraq and Jordan because it would isolate her from Egypt and Saudi Arabia.^{31/} Besides with this in mind, the ex-facti pressed for the treating of the refugees under Colonel Balabani, head of the Syrian Army, perhaps in preparation for future guerrilla warfare.^{32/}

The fact's relations with Jordan are undergoing a decided change due to both King Faisal's anti-British reputation and his sympathy for the fact's cause.^{33/} It is also significant to note that one of Hussein's most active supporters, former commander of the Hussein al-Furath was elected recently to the Jordanian Parliament.^{34/} Furthermore Faisal is now expected to visit King Ibn Saud ostensibly to end their feud.^{35/} Hussein's participation in a conference with Saudi Arabian and Egyptian Foreign Ministers, presumably to prevent a Hashemite merger, further indicates his political strength.^{36/}

His attitude toward the "fact" has varied. He has remained adamantly opposed to British interference in the Islamic World,^{37/} but until recently had credited any public statements against the US.^{38/} In August the American Embassy in Cairo reported that the ex-facti was prepared to ally himself with the Russians or the Americans. If he were to ally himself with the US he would expect support in the restoration of an Arab Palestine, and his family as its hereditary rulers. In return he promised to effect an anti-Communist front.^{39/}

Another source indicates the fact's ideas have changed with international developments, and though he hates the Soviets he must be realistic.^{40/} He feels that the Hashemite elements in the Middle East are too weak to counteract an effective Arab against Communism and implied that only through an Islamic appeal could the US expect to gain the support of the Arab world.^{41/} Recently it was reported, however, that the ex-facti had urged his son to abrogate American, French and British interests, which may be a more probing American's condemnation of Egypt's divergence now.^{42/}

The ex-facti's connections with Russia have been skillfully camouflaged. There is little doubt he has had contacts with Soviet agents but other than reports that he is receiving money from Moscow, little is known about the nature of the connection.^{43/} One reliable source stated the facti had said "The Mohammedans will never be Bolsheviks" nevertheless he indicated that his best propaganda support was coming from the Soviets not the fact.^{44/} Recently the ex-facti received messages from the Soviets that they would not allow their stand for an Independent Arab Palestine.^{45/}

There may at times, a relative of the facti by marriage and a reliable source

MUSKINI, Amin al (Ba)

Remarks: (Continued)

stated that the Mufti is a cunning, shrewd politician who will go to any ends to obtain his goal and that he is capable of getting rid of his enemies "if this furthers the Arab Cause." ^{31/} Practically all sources concur that the ex-Mufti is one of the shrewdest of Arab leaders, rather unanimously distrusted, but none the less to be feared.

If a photograph is desired, inquiry may be directed to Graphics Register, OCB.

SOURCES:

1/ State MI Files Report, 24 April 1951, Confidential.
International Who's Who-1949, Unclassified.
New York Times, 3 September 1951, Unclassified.
State B-525, Damascus, 25 May 1951, Confidential.
CIA, OO-B-38736, 5 September 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
Army, MAR-13/15, Pakistan, 26 March 1951, Confidential.
FRIS-147, 24 July 1951, Restricted.
CIA, 80-66784, 28 June 1951, Confidential/Control/US Officials Only.
CIA, 80-67086, 29 June 1951, Confidential/Control/US Officials Only.
State B-728, Damascus, 13 June 1951, Confidential.
CIA, 80-68999, 25 July 1951, Confidential.
State B-47, Beirut, 16 July 1951, Confidential.
CIA, OO-W-14383, 13 October 1950, Restricted.
New York Times, 20 July 1951, Unclassified.
State B-271, Cairo, 7 August 1951, Unclassified.
CIA, 80-72220, 24 September 1951, Confidential/Control/US Officials Only.
Army B-441-51, B-2, 10 September 1951, Restricted.
CIA, FB-380, 17 August 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
Time, 17 September 1951, Unclassified.
New York Times, 8/21/51, Unclassified.
CIA-OO-B-37977, 3-5 August 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
CIA, 80-72714, 27 September 1951, Secret.
Army, R-489-51, Israel, 7 August 1951, Unclassified.
CIA, 80-72981, 28 September 1951, Secret.
CIA, 80-67977, 16 July 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
Syrian Minister to US-Oral, 17 October 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
CIA, FB-69, 2 November 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
CIA, OO-B-38366, 25 August 1951, Confidential/Control/US Officials Only.
Army, Intelligence Review #185, October 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
CIA, 80-70011, 14 August 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
CIA, 80-67034, 17 August 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
State B-65, Jerusalem, 22 August 1951, Unclassified.
New York Times, 6 November 1951, Unclassified.
State, B-326, Cairo, 19 August 1951, Secret.
CIA, FB-699, 26 October 1951, Secret.
CIA, OO-B-40993, 15 October 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
Mass Al-Azani, Oral, July 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.

FOG:am (44)

2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176